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Abstract—Many important real-world decision making prob-
lems involve group interactions among individuals with purely
informational externalities, such situations arise for example in
jury deliberations, expert committees, medical diagnosis, etc. In
this paper, we will use the framework of iterated eliminations
to model the decision problem as well as the thinking process
of a Bayesian agent in a group decision/discussion scenario. We
model the purely informational interactions of rational agents in
a group, where they receive private information and act based
upon that information while also observing other people’s beliefs.
As the Bayesian agent attempts to infer the true state of the world
from her sequence of observations which include her neighbors’
beliefs as well as her own private signal, she recursively refines
her belief about the signals that other players could have observed
and beliefs that they would have hold given the assumption
that other players are also rational. We further analyze the
computational complexity of the Bayesian belief formation in
groups and show that it is NP-hard. We also investigate the
factors underlying this computational complexity and show how
belief calculations simplify in special network structures or cases
with strong inherent symmetries. We finally give insights about
the statistical efficiency (optimality) of the beliefs and its relations
to computational efficiency.
Index Terms—Rational Choice theory, Computational social
choice, Distributed hypothesis testing, Bayesian inference, Com-
putational complexity, Bayesian computations
I. INTRODUCTION
In decision theory, the seminal work of Aumann [1] studies
the interactions of two rational agents with common prior
beliefs and concludes that if the values of their posterior beliefs
are common knowledge between the two agents, then the two
values should be the same: rational agents cannot agree to
disagree. The later work of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
[2] investigates how rational agents reach an agreement by
communicating back and forth and refining their information
partitions. Following [1] and [2], a large body of literature
studies strategic interaction of agents in a social network,
where they receive private information and act based upon that
information while also observing each other’s actions [3], [4].
Although this model is motivated by the interactions of people
in a group, the so-called group decision process (GDP), the
same framework can be applied in the analysis of distributed
estimation and consensus problems [5], [6], [7].
When making decisions under uncertainty, the agents form
beliefs about unknown parameters of interest and their actions
and decisions reflect their beliefs. In this paper, we focus
on a case where agents announce their beliefs truthfully at
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every decision epoch; in practice, jurors may express their
belief about the probability of guilt in a criminal case or more
generally people may make statements that are expressive of
their beliefs. In [8] Eyster and Rabin explain that rich-enough
action spaces can reveal the underlying beliefs that lead to
actions; subsequently, an individual’s action is a fine reflection
of her beliefs.
The rational approach advocates formation of Bayesian
posterior beliefs by application of Bayes rule to the entire
sequence of observations successively at every step. Calculat-
ing the Bayesian posterior belief in partially observed settings
such as GDP is notoriously difficult as the Bayesian agent
should reason about the third party interactions that precede
(and are the causes of) her observations and are not observable
to her. Moreover, when a rational agent observes her neighbors
in a network, she should compensate for the repetitions in the
sources of her information: several of the neighboring agents
may have been influenced by the same source of information
(type-I repetitions) and neighboring actions may have been
affected by the past actions of the agent herself (type-II rep-
etitions); all these lead to inter-dependencies and correlations
in the information received from different neighbors. Failure
to account for such structural dependencies subjects the agents
to mistakes and inefficiencies such as redundancy neglect [8],
and data incest [9], caused by type-I and type-II repetitions
respectively.
In recent works, recursive techniques have been applied
to analyze Bayesian decision problems with partial success
[10], [11]. In this work, we are particularly interested in the
computations that the Bayesian agent should undertake to
achieve her goal of producing best recommendations/beliefs at
every decision epoch during a group discussion. In this note,
we will follow the framework of iterated eliminations to model
the thinking process of a Bayesian agent in a group decision-
making scenario as she refines her beliefs with the increasing
history of observations. The iterated elimination approach that
is describe in Section II curbs some of the complexities of
GDP, but only to a limited extent. In a group decision scenario,
the initial private signals of the agents constitute a search space
that is exponential in the size of the network. The ultimate
goal of the agents is to get informed about the private signals
of each other, information that is reflected in their beliefs.
The Bayesian agent is initially informed of only her own
signal; however, as her history of interactions with other group
members becomes enriched, her knowledge of the possible
private signals that others may have observed also gets refined;
thus enabling her to form more refined beliefs.
These calculations of the Bayesian agent can be cast in the
framework of a partially observed Markov decision process
(POMDP). Accordingly, the private signals of all agents con-
stitute the state space of the problem and the decision maker
only has access to a deterministic function of the state, the so-
called partial observations. In GDP the beliefs of the neighbors
constitute each agent’s partial observations. The partially ob-
served problem and its relations to the decentralized and team
decision problems have been the subject of major classical
contributions [12], [13]; in particular, the partially observed
problem is known to be PSPACE-hard in the worst case [14,
Theorem 6]. However, unlike the general POMDP, the state
(private signals) in a GDP do not undergo Markovian jumps
as they are fixed at the initiation of GDP. Hence, determining
the complexity of GDP requires a different analysis. To address
this requirement, in Section III we introduce and analyze
a structural property of the graph which we refer to as
transparency and it plays a critical role in characterizing the
hardness and determining the computations of a Bayesian
agent when forming her posterior beliefs. In the extended
online version of our work [15], we provide our NP-hardness
proof, showing that well-known NP-complete problems are
special cases of GDP. This result complements and informs
the existing literature on Bayesian learning over networks; in
particular, those which offer efficient algorithms for special
settings such as Gaussian signals and state space [16], or with
binary actions in a complete graph [17].
II. FORMATION OF BAYESIAN BELIEFS: THE
GROUP-DECISION PROBLEM
Consider a society of n agents that are labeled by [n] =
{1, . . . , n} and interact according to a fixed directed graph G.
For each agent i ∈ [n], Ni denotes a fixed neighborhood Ni ⊂
[n] that is the set of all agents observed by agent i. We use
δ(j, i) to denote the length (number of edges) of the shortest
path connecting j to i. The agents engage in discussion by
repeatedly exchanging their beliefs about an issue of common
interest. We model the topic of the discussion/group-decision
process by a state θ belonging to a finite set Θ. For example in
the course of a political debate, Θ can be the set of all political
parties and it would take a binary value in a bipartisan system.
The value/identity of θ is not known to the agents but they each
receive a private signal about the unknown θ. Each signal si
belongs to a finite set Si and its distribution conditioned on θ
is given by Pi,θ(·) which is referred to as the signal structure
of agent i. We use Pθ(·) to denote the joint distribution of the
private signals of all agents, signals being independent across
the agents. Starting from a full-support prior belief ν(·), at any
time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} the agent holds a belief µi,t, which is
her Bayesian posterior on Θ given her knowledge of the signal
structure and priors as well as her history of observations,
which include her initial private signal as well as the beliefs
that she has observed in her neighbors throughout past times
τ < t. Throughout the paper, any random variable is denoted
in boldface letter, vectors are represented in lowercase letters
with a bar over them.
Building on the prior works [11], we now describe in detail
the Bayesian calculations that take place among the group
members. To calculate her Bayesian posterior, each agent
keeps track of a list of possible combinations of private signals
of all other agents, and at each iteration after simulating the
network at every possible combination of the private signals,
she crosses out the entries in her list that are inconsistent with
the beliefs that she has observed from her neighbors up to
that point. In this scheme, the agent not only needs to keep
track of the list of private signals that are consistent with her
observations, but also to evaluate the consistency of each of
these signal profiles she needs to consider what other agents
regard as consistent with their own observations under the
particular set of initial signals. The latter consideration enables
the decision maker to calculate beliefs of other agents under
any circumstances that arise at a fixed profile of initial signals,
as she tries to evaluate the feasibility of that particular signal
profile. Hence, the list of private signals can be regarded as
the information set representing the current understanding of
the agent about her environment and the way additional obser-
vations are informative is by trimming the current information
set and reducing the ambiguity in the set of initial signals that
have caused the agent’s history of past observations.
To proceed, let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn be a
typical profile of initial signals observed by each agent across
the network, and denote the set of all private signal profiles
that agent i regards as feasible at time t, i.e. her information
set at time t, by Ii,t ⊂ S1× . . .×Sn; this set is a random set,
as it is determined by the random observations of agent i up to
time t. Starting form Ii,0 = {si}×
∏
j 6=i Sj , at every decision
epoch t agent i removes those signal profiles in Ii,t−1 that are
not consistent with her history of observations up to time t and
comes up with a trimmed set of signal profiles Ii,t ⊂ Ii,t−1
to form her Bayesian posterior belief and make her decision
at time t.
The set of feasible signals Ii,t is mapped to a Bayesian









In this sense, the Bayesian posterior is a sufficient statistic for
the history of observations and unlike the observation history,
it does not grow in dimension. For example at time 0 agent i
learns her private signal si, this enables her to initialize her list
of feasible signals: Ii,0 = {si}×
∏
k∈[n]\{i} Sk. Subsequently,











At time 1 having observed her neighbor’s beliefs from time
0 agent i learns the likelihood of their private signals of each
of her neighbors {sj , j ∈ Ni}. Subsequently, she crosses out





thus pruning Ii,0 into the smaller set Ii,1. She then updates
her Bayesian posterior µi,1 according to (1). Note that the
initial belief exchanges between neighbors reveal the likeli-
hoods of the private signals in the neighboring agents. Hence,
from her observations of the beliefs of her neighbors at time
zero {µj,0, j ∈ Ni}, agent i learns all that she ever needs
to know regarding the private signals of her neighbors so far
as their influence on her beliefs about the unknown state θ is
concerned. At time 2, the agent observes her neighbors’ beliefs
{µj,1, j ∈ Ni} for a second time. The second interaction
informs her about what beliefs her neighbor’s neighbors may
have hold at time 0 and in turn what private signals they have
observed at time 0. To proceed, we introduce the notation N τi
as the τ -th order neighborhood of agent i comprising entirely
of those agents who are connected to agent i through a walk
of length τ : N τi = {j ∈ [n] : j ∈ Ni1 , i1 ∈ Ni2 , . . . , iτ−1 ∈
Ni, for some i1, . . . , iτ−1 ∈ [n]}; in particular, N 1i = Ni
and we use the convention N 0i = {i}. We further denote
N¯ ti := ∪tτ=0N τi as the set of all agents who are within
distance t of or closer to agent i, i.e. at most t hops away
from i. We sometimes refer to N¯ ti as her t-radius ego-net.
Considering her neighbors’ neighbors for the first time at
t = 2, agent i calculates the time one beliefs of all of the
agents in N 2i for each of the signal profiles belonging to
Ii,1 and use the result to calculate the time two beliefs of
all her neighbors for each s ∈ Ii,1. Any s for which the
calculated time 2 belief of some neighbor j ∈ Ni does not
agree with the observed belief µj,2 is subsequently removed
from Ii,1 and the updated list Ii,2 is thus obtained. A similar
set of calculations is repeated at time three: for every signal
profile in Ii,2 that have survived the pruning process up until
t = 3, the agent starts by calculating the beliefs of agents
in N 3i at time zero (as determined by their private signals
fixed in s). These beliefs along with the rest of the private
signal in turn determine the beliefs of the agents in N 2i at time
one as well those of Ni at time two; subsequently, the agent
can compare the latter calculated beliefs with her most recent
observation of her neighbors’ beliefs and eliminate the signal
profiles for which there is a mismatch. This process can be
formalized as an iterated eliminations algorithm for computing
the Bayesian posterior belief in a general network at any time
t, [15, Algorithm A4]. However, the resultant computations
increase exponentially in n and in fact they can be bounded
as O(n2M2n−1m), where M is an upper bound on the size of
the signal space and m is the cardinality of the state space Θ.
We now describe the GROUP-DECISION problem formally.In
the extended online version of our work [15], we show that for
general network structures (and in the worst case) one cannot
hope to do much better than an exponential-time algorithm (if
P 6= NP): “GROUP-DECISION is NP-hard”.
Consider the finite state space Θ = {θ1, . . . , θm} and for
all 2 ≤ k ≤ m, let: λi(θk) := log (Pi,θk(si)/Pi,θ1(si))
, φi,t(θk) := log (µi,t(θk)/µi,t(θ1)). Here and throughout
the rest of the paper, we assume the agents have started
from uniform prior beliefs and the size of the state space is
m = 2, thence we enjoy a slightly simpler notation; otherwise
knowing the (non-uniform) priors of each other the agents
can always compensate for the effect of the priors as they
observe each others’ beliefs. Moreover, with a binary state
space Θ = {θ1, θ2}, the agents need to only keep track of
one set of belief and likelihood ratios corresponding to the
pair (θ1, θ2), whereas in general the agents should form and
calculate m − 1 ratio terms for each of the pairs (θ1, θk),
k = 2, . . . ,m to have a fully specified belief. For a binary
state space with no danger of confusion we can use the
simplified notation λi = λi(θ2) := log (Pi,θ2(si)/Pi,θ1(si)),
and φi,t = φi,t(θ2) = log (µi,t(θ2)/µi,t(θ1)).
Problem 1 (GROUP-DECISION). At any time t, given the
knowledge of graph and signal structures, as well as the
private signal si and the history of observed neighboring
beliefs µj,τ , j ∈ Ni, τ ∈ [t − 1] determine the Bayesian
posterior belief µi,t.
In general GROUP-DECISION is a hard problem and we
provide the formal NP-hardness proof details in [15, Section
5]. We study the structural features that lead to this hardness
in Section III; in particular, we investigate special cases where
the calculations simplify and efficient algorithms are possible.
III. TRANSPARENT STRUCTURES: STATISTICAL AND
COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
Here, we introduce a special class of structures which play
an important role in determining the type of calculations that
agent i should undertake to determine her posterior belief
(recall from Section II that the t-radius ego-net of agent i,
N¯ ti , is the set of all agents who are within distance t of or
closer to agent i, i.e. at most t hops away from i):
Definition 1 (Transparency). The graph structure G is trans-
parent to agent i at time t, if for all j ∈ Ni and every τ ≤ t−1
we have that: φj,τ =
∑
k∈N¯ τj λk, for any choice of signal
structures and all possible initial signals.
Remark 1 (Transparency, statistical efficiency, and impartial
inference). Such agents j whose beliefs satisfy the equation
in Definition 1 at some time τ are said to hold a transparent or
efficient belief; the latter signifies the fact that the such a belief
coincides with the Bayesian posterior if agent j were given a
direct access to the private signals of every agent in N¯ τj . This
is indeed the best possible (or statistically efficient) belief that
agent j can hope to form given the information available to
her at time τ . The same connection to the statistically efficient
beliefs arise in the work of Eyster and Rabin who formulate the
closely related concept of “impartial inference” in a model of
sequential decisions by different players in successive rounds
[18]; accordingly, impartial inference ensures that the full
informational content of all signals that influence a player’s
beliefs can be extracted and players can fully (rather than par-
tially) infer their predecessors’ signals. In other words, under
impartial inference, players’ immediate predecessors provide
“sufficient statistics” for earlier movers that are indirectly
observed [18, Section 3]. Last but not least, it is worth noting
that statistical efficiency or impartial inference are properties
of the posterior beliefs, and as such the signal structures may
be designed so that statistical efficiency or impartial inference
hold true for a particular problem setting; on the other hand,
transparency is a structural property of the network and would
hold true for any choice of signal structures and all possible
initial signals.
The following is a sufficient graphical condition for agent i
to hold an efficient (transparent) belief at time t: there are no
agents k ∈ N¯ ti that has multiple paths to agent i, unless it is
among its neighbors (directly observed by it).1
Proposition 1 (Graphical condition for transparency). Agent
i will hold a transparent (efficient) belief at time t if there are
no k ∈ N¯ ti \Ni such that for j 6= j′, both j and j′ belonging
to Ni, we have k ∈ N¯ t−1j and k ∈ N¯ t−1j′ .
The proof of this proposition can be found in the extended
online version of our manuscript [15, Proposition 4.3]. It is
worth noting that in the course of the proof, for the structures
that satisfy the sufficient condition for transparency, we obtain
a simple algorithm for updating beliefs by setting the total
innovation at every step equal to the sum of the most recent
innovations observed at each of the neighbors, correcting for
those neighbors who are being recounted:
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• φi,t = φi,t−1 + φˆi,t.
Rooted (directed) trees are a special class of transparent
structures, which also satisfy the sufficient structural condition
of Proposition 1; indeed, in case of a rooted tree for any agent
k that is indirectly observed by agent i, there is a unique path
connecting k to i. As such the correction terms for the sum
of innovations observed in the neighbors is always zero, and
we have φˆi,t =
∑
j∈Ni φˆj,t−1, i.e. the innovation at every
time step is equal to the total innovations observed in all the
neighbors.
Example 1 (Transparent structures).
Fig. 1 illustrates cases of transparent and nontransparent
structures. We refer to them as first, second, third, and forth
in their respective order from left to right. All structures except
the first one are transparent. To see how the transparency is
violated in the first structure, consider the beliefs of agent i:
φi,0 = λi, φi,1 = λi+λj1+λj2 ; at time two, agent 1 observes
φj1,1 = λj1+λk1+λk2 and φj2,1 = λj2+λk2+λk3 . Knowing
φj1,0 = λj1 and φj2,0 = λj2 she can infer the value of the
two sub-sums λk1 +λk2 and λk1 +λk3 , but there is no way for
her to infer their total sum λj1 +λj2 +λk1 +λk2 +λk3 . Agent
i cannot hold an efficient or transparent belief at time two. The
issue is resolved in the second structure by adding a direct link
1Jadbabaie would like to acknowledge his private communications about
similar conditions that arise in the study of other learning models with P.
Molavi.
so that agent k2 is directly observed by agent i; the sufficient
structural condition of Proposition 1 is thus satisfied and we
have φi,2 = λi+λj1+λj2+λk1+λk2+λk3 . In structure three,
we have φi,2 = λi+λj1+λj2+λk1+λk2 = λi+φj1,1+φj2,0.
Structure four is also transparent and we have φi,2 = λi +
λj1 + λj2 + λk1 + λk2 + λk3 + λk4 = λi + φj1,1 + φj2,1
and φi,3 = λi + λj1 + λj2 + λk1 + λk2 + λk3 + λk4 +
λl = λi + φj1,1 + φj2,1 + (φj1,2 − φj1,1), where in the last
equality we have used the fact that λl = (φj1,2 − φj1,1).
In particular, note that structures three and four violate the
sufficient structural condition laid out in Proposition 1, despite
both being transparent.
Fig. 1: Only the leftmost structure is not transparent.
When the transparency condition is violated, the neighbor-
ing agents’ beliefs is a complicated non-linear function of
the signal likelihoods of the upstream (indirectly observed)
neighbors. Therefore, making inferences about the unobserved
private signals from such “nontransparent” beliefs is a very
complex task: it ultimately leads to agent i reasoning about
feasible signal profiles that are consistent with her observa-
tions following the iterated elimination procedure described
in Section II.
When the transparency conditions are satisfied, the beliefs
of the neighboring agents reveal the sum of log-likelihoods
for the private signals of other agents within a distance t of
agent i. Nevertheless, even when the network is transparent to
agent i, cases arise where efficient algorithms for calculating
Bayesian posterior beliefs for agent i are unavailable and
indeed impossible (if P 6= NP). In Subsection III-A, we
describe the calculations of the Bayesian posterior belief when
the transparency condition is satisfied.
A. Belief calculations in transparent structures
Here we describe calculations of a Bayesian agent in a
transparent structure. If the network is transparent to agent
i, she has access to the following information from the beliefs
that she has observed in her neighbors at times τ ≤ t, before
deciding her belief for time t+ 1:
• Her own signal si and its log-likelihood λi.
• Her observations of the neighboring beliefs: {µj,τ : j ∈
Ni, τ ≤ t}. Due to transparency, these beliefs reveal the
following information about sums of log-likelihoods of
private signals of subsets of other agents in the network:∑
k∈N¯ τj λk = φi,τ , for all τ ≤ t, and any j ∈ Ni.
From the information available to her, agent i aims to learn
as much as possible about the likelihoods of the private signals
of others whom she does not observe; indeed, as she has
already learned the likelihoods of the signals that her neighbors
have observed from their reported beliefs at time one, at times
t > 1 she is interested in learning about the agents that are
further away from her up to the distance t. Her best hope for
time t+ 1 is to learn the sum of log-likelihoods of the signals
of all agents that are within distance of at most t+1 from her
(at most t + 1-hops away from her in the graph), and to set
her posterior belief accordingly; this however is not always
possible as demonstrated for agent i in the leftmost graph of
Fig. 1. To form her belief, agent i constructs the following
system of linear equations in card
(N¯t+1]) + 1 unknowns:
{λj : j ∈ N¯t+1, and λ¯i,t+1}, where λ¯i,t+1 =
∑
j∈N¯t+1 λj
is the best possible (statistically efficient) belief for agent i at
time t+ 1, given all the information available to her:{∑
k∈N¯ τj λk = φj,τ , for all τ ≤ t, and any j ∈ Ni,∑
j∈N¯ t+1i λj − λ¯i,t+1 = 0.
(2)
She can apply the Gauss-Jordan (factor and solve, Cholesky,
QR or any other) method and convert the system of linear
equations in card
(N¯ t+1i ) + 1 variables to its reduced row
echelon form. Next if in the reduced row echelon form λ¯i,t
is a basic variable with fixed value (its corresponding column
has a unique non-zero element that is a one, and that one
belongs to a row with all zero elements except itself), then
she sets her belief optimally such that φi,t+1 = λ¯i,t+1; this is
the statistically efficient belief at time t+ 1. Recall that in the
case of a binary state space, log-belief ratio φi,t+1 uniquely
determines the belief µi,t+1.
Remark 2 (Statistical and computational efficiency). Having
φi,t+1 = λ¯i,t+1 signifies the best achievable belief given the
observations of the neighboring beliefs as it corresponds to the
statistically efficient belief that the agent would have adopted,
had she direct access to the private signals of every agent
within distance t+ 1 from her (at most t+ 1-hops away from
her); notwithstanding the efficient case φi,t+1 = λ¯i,t+1 does
not necessarily imply that that agent i learns the likelihoods
of the signals of other agents in N¯ t+1i ; indeed, this was the
case for agent i in the forth (transparent) structure of Example
1: agent i learns {λi,λj1 ,λj2 ,λk1 + λk2 ,λk3 + λk4 ,λl}
and in particular can determine the efficient beliefs λ¯i,2 =
λi+λj1 +λj2 +λk1 +λk2 +λk3 +λk4 and λ¯i,3 = λi+λj1 +
λj2+λk1+λk2+λk3+λk4+λl, but she never learns the actual
values of the likelihoods {λk1 ,λk2 ,λk3 ,λk4}, individually.
In other words, it is possible for agent i to determine the
sum of log-likelihoods of signals of agents in her higher-
order neighborhoods even though she does not learn about
each signal likelihood individually. The case where λ¯i,t+1
can be determined uniquely so that φi,t+1 = λ¯i,t+1, is not
only statistically efficient but also computationally efficient
as complexity of determining the Bayesian posterior belief
at time t + 1 is the same as the complexity of performing
Gauss-Jordan steps which is O(n3) for solving the t.card(Ni)
equations in card(N¯ t+1i ) unknowns. Note that here we make
no attempt to optimize these computations beyond the fact that
their growth is polynomial in n.
Next we consider the case where λ¯i,t+1 is not a basic
variable in the reduced row echelon form of system (2) or
it is a basic variable but its value is not fixed by the system
and depends on how the free variables are set. In such cases
agent i does not have access to the statistically efficient belief
λ¯i,t+1. Instead she has to form her Bayesian posterior belief
by inferring the set of all feasible signals for all agents in
card(N¯ t+1i ) whose likelihoods are consistent with the system
(2). To this end, she keeps track of the set of all signal profiles
at any time t that are consistent with her information, system
(2), at that time. Following the iterated elimination procedure
of Section II, let us denote the set of feasible signal profiles
for agent i at time t by Ii,t. The general strategy of agent i,
would be to search over all elements of Ii,t−1 and to eliminate
(refute) any signal profiles that is inconsistent with (i.e. does
not satisfy) the Ni new equations revealed to her at time t
from the transparent beliefs of her neighbors.
Despite the relative simplification that is brought about by
transparency, in general there is an exponential number of
feasible signal profiles and verifying them for the new Ni
equations would take exponential time. The belief calculations
may be optimized by inferring the largest subset of individual
likelihood ratios whose summation is fixed by system (2). The
verification and refutation process can then be restricted to the
remaining signals whose sum of log-likelihoods is not fixed
by system (2). For example in leftmost structure of Fig. 1,
agent i will not hold a transparent belief at time 2 but she
can determine the sub-sum λi + λj1 + λj2 and her belief
would involve a search only over the profile of the signals
of the remaining agents (sk1 , sk2 , sk3). At time two, she finds
all (sk1 , sk2 , sk3) that agree with the additionally inferred sub-
sums φj1,1−φj1,0 = λk1+λk2 and φj2,1−φj2,0 = λk2+λk3 ;
indeed we can express φi,2 as follows:
φi,2 = λi + λj1 + λj2+
log
∑
(sk1 ,sk2 ,sk3 )∈Ii,2 Pk1,θ2(sk1)Pk2,θ2(sk2)Pk3,θ2(sk3)∑
(sk1 ,sk2 ,sk3 )∈Ii,2 Pk1,θ1(sk1)Pk2,θ1(sk2)Pk3,θ1(sk3)
,
where














= λk2 + λk3}.
Here we make no attempt in optimizing the computations for
the refutation process in transparent structures beyond pointing
out that they can increase exponentially with the network size.
In the extended online version of this work, we show that
well-known NP-complete problems are special cases of the
GROUP-DECISION problem and as such the latter is NP-
hard [15, Theorem 5.1]; there we also provide examples of
special cases where a more positive answer is available and
provide an efficient algorithm accordingly.
Theorem 1 (Hardness of GROUP-DECISION). The GROUP-
DECISION (Problem 1) is NP-hard.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We studied the formation of Bayesian posterior beliefs during a
group decision process: starting with a private signal, neighboring
agents repeatedly observe each others beliefs and form refined
opinions based on their observations. We described a process of
iterated elimination which requires the agent to repeatedly search
over the exponential space of feasible signal profiles and refine it
with her increasing observations. This algorithm runs in exponential
time and we showed that the formation of Bayesian posterior beliefs
is NP-hard, so that one cannot hope for a significant improvement
in the running time for general structures. We further, analyzed a
graph structural property called “transparency”, which implies that
neighboring agents’ beliefs are statistically efficient; in the sense that
they reveal the aggregate information regarding the private signals of
all agents who have influenced their decisions thus far (directly or
indirectly). There is a key difference between the refutation process
when the network is transparent to agent i and the pruning that takes
place in the iterated elimination process for general (non-transparent)
networks. In the latter case, the agent needs to consider the beliefs
of other far way agents at any possible signal profile and to simulate
the subsequent beliefs of her neighbors conditioned on the particular
signal profile. Each signal profile will be rejected and removed from
the feasible set if the simulated belief of a neighbor conditioned on
that signal profile does not agree with the actual (observed) beliefs at
that time. On the other hand, in a transparent structure, the agent does
not need to simulate the beliefs of other agents conditioned on a signal
profile to investigate its feasibility. She can directly verify whether the
individual signals likelihoods satisfy the most recent set of constraints
that are revealed to the agent at time t from the transparent beliefs of
her neighbors; and if any one of the new equations is violated then,
that signal profile will be rejected and removed from the feasible
set. This constitutes an interesting bridge between statistical and
computational efficiency in the group decision process.
Although determining the posterior beliefs during a GDP is, in
general, NP-hard [15, Theorem 5.1], for transparent structures the
posterior belief at each step can be computed efficiently using the
reported beliefs of the neighbors. Furthermore, the optimality of
belief exchange over transparent structures is a unique structural
feature of the inference set up in GDP. It provides an interesting and
distinct addition to known optimality conditions for inference prob-
lems over graphs. In particular, the transparent structures over which
efficient and optimal Bayesian belief exchange is achievable include
1It is well known that if a Bayesian network has a tree (singly connected
or polytree) structure, then efficient inference can be achieved using belief
propagation (message passing or sum-product algorithms), cf. [19]. However,
in general loopy structures, belief propagation only gives a (potentially useful)
approximation of the desired posteriors [20]. Notwithstanding, our Bayesian
belief exchange set up also greatly simplifies in the case of tree structures,
admitting a trivial sum of innovations algorithm. The authors in [21] study
the complexity landscape of inference problems over graphical models in
terms of their treewidth. For bounded treewidth structures the junction-tree
method (performing belief propagation on the tree decomposition of the
graph) works efficiently [22] but there is no class of graphical models with
unbounded treewidth in which inference can be performed in time polynomial
in treewidth.
many loopy structures in addition to trees.1 It would be particularly
interesting if one can provide a tight graphical characterization for
transparency or provide other useful sufficient conditions that ensure
transparency and complement our Proposition 1. More importantly,
one would look for other characterizations of the complexity land-
scape and find other notions of simplicity that are different from
transparency.
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